Bare Particular and Particularly Bare Ontologies

I had a short conversation with Kevin Houser, a local philosophy graduate student, about conventionalism in matters of individuation. For some reason in the process of Kevin's studies, he ran into the question (which he apparently must have some answer for)of whether or not the world is, proverbially, 'carved at its joints'. In other words, do we, as cognizers, hoist our concepts upon the world, individuating it and picking out entities of our own accord, or do we find objects pre-individuated and merely form concepts to comprehend and categorize them?

Kevin seems to think that the former has intuitive pull to it - we divide the world into differing numerically distinct objects according perhaps to our physical capacities (our basic chemical composition, the way our ocular system is configured, etc.) or our particular interests - perhaps we wish to define objects as those spatio-temporal continuants which have a minimal amount of change over time, as Hirsch does.

Let me weigh in here. I think the view that the world is ontologically nothing in particular is rather ridiculous for the following reason: particulars being nothing in particular is absurd. The thought being that if it makes no sense to talk of objects that are nothing in particular and the world is made up of objects, it makes no sense to talk of a world that is nothing in particular. I think there are good reasons for thinking that objects must have a certain character without which they could not exist and so I think that there are good grounds for thinking, via generalization, that the world is that way as well.

There are a few common ways that one might initially object. One can make the principled denial that there simply are no ways that objects must be - or, anti-essentialism. Or, one might claim that the objects in the world have distinctive features such that they could not lack them and yet exist, but that these features are merely conceptual constraints which we impose upon them - or, conceptualism.

Let me take issue with the first of these, which I think sheds important light on the second. I think a rather simple way to go about the denial of anti-essentialism is to make it clear that objects have certain abilities. If one is a sortal-essentialist, for instance, one will take an object to have a set of abilities which are in accord with the sortal under which it falls. But notice that for an object to have an ability it must likewise have the proper 'vehicle' to acquire the ability - the octopus has the ability to live underwater and it is its physio-chemical make-up which is the vehicle for it having this ability. But notice also that no vehicle is had without it being able to have been had, since it is a necessary truth that if an object x has P, x is able to have P - or if P(x), then Possibly P(x). The point here is that, at ground floor, it cannot be the case that no object has any abilities necessarily, because the absence of some (basic) abilities will preclude the object from having any vehicles and/or abilities whatsoever. The suggestion being that the essence of an object is that which allows for any and all properties that it might possess.

Taking this as a rough argument against anti-essentialism, one might yet object: Sure, an object must have a certain feature that enables it to be anything at all, one that grounds it having any properties whatsoever, but we are the ones who give it such features by categorizing it under certain sortal terms. Here is how I would respond, ala Wiggins. It is true that we, as cognizers, conceptualize objects under certain sortals and make modal judgments based on their being so characterized. But, the modal principle remains - what is actual for an object is possible for an object. Why is this relevant to this question? Consider a pumpkin; it is, after all, that time of the year.

Suppose one carved out of a pumpkin a small square and held it in his hand declaring, "This object that I hold in my hand is defined purely by my own will - I decided upon its features, choosing ones which were relevant to my interests. The way this object is, since I have formed it, has nothing to do with the way the pumpkin is". What are we to say to this? I think the proper response is something like, "Look, you may have decided on the shape and the length and the breadth of this object, but you did not - and could not - decide on what it is, at root. Furthermore, the way this object is does say something about the way the pumpkin is - for one, that the pumpkin is such that it allows for you to form such an object from it."

The intuitive thought: even if it were the case that cognizers themselves decided upon the 'boundary' or individuating features of the everyday objects of experience, there are two things which no cognizer could, even in principle, decide upon: the limits - the possibility or contingency/necessity - of their being able to impose such categorizations of individuality and, consequently, whether or not the their decision reflects something about reality.