Counterpart theorists argue that they can avoid an unwarranted primitivism about de re modality because they can explain why it is that objects have the de re modal properties they have. Other positions, such as Sortal Essentialism and/or Dispositional Actualism, must declare de re modal properties to be primitive facts. The Counterpart theorist however, can explain why x is possibly F: x has at least one counterpart that is F in some possible world.
L.A. Paul is concerned that the actualist who is not a Counterpart theorist must posit a spooky "Modal Force" inherent in objects that governs their de re modal properties.
But note that the Counterpart theorist has an even more disturbing primitive: Possible Worlds!; even more so, if - following the originator of Counterpart theory - you hold that these worlds are concrete entities.
I am more concerned about spooky "Other Worlds" that exist as a matter of primitive fact. Which primitive am I to prefer? I say the one that causes the least ripples throughout our current conceptual scheme and which is least capable of reduction. I therefore prefer the spooky Modal Force: it's adoption not only doesn't change the character of physics, but it is instead supported and perhaps suggested by modern physics; so it causes less ripples than the posit of an infinity of possible worlds. And such a concept does not, unlike possible worlds (abstract or concrete), cry out for conceptual reduction.
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