I recently was sent an upcoming article by Andrew Chignell from Allen Wood about Kant's ontological argument. Here are some thoughts that I sent to Professor Wood about Chignell's article and a brief analysis of the seeming incoherency (or incompleteness) of Kant's account.
As far as I can tell, Chignell seems to think that Kant's proof doesn't end up working because he has yet to show that all of the 'fundamental' properties are 'harmonious' - ie. that their combination in a single subject is metaphysically possible, where metaphysically possible means that the properties in question actually do not conflict, rather than it being the case that one cannot concieve their non-conflict (this Kant takes to be the characteristic form of logical possibility). Of course, as Chignell states, Leibniz's proof is certainly merely logical in this sense, since he takes properties to express 'reality' or 'positive degrees of perfection' which cannot conflict with one another due to contradictions arising only 'through negation'. Chignell maintains that Kant does not (and cannot) prove the material coherence of all of the fundamental properties with one another and so his proof rests on the same shaky footing as Leibniz's.
I wonder though, about the status of Kant's assumption of real, metaphysical possibility being fundamentally conditioned by actuality. As you know, there are many philosophers who think that an actualist metaphysic fails because of singular existential statements involving non-existent entites - the worry is: how do you ground the fact that there might have existed some obect x, wholly distinct from every other actual object? Of course, I think Adams' "true at" and "true in" distinction of possible world semantics solves this problem well enough.
But there is another worry that I wonder about - so-called 'Aristotelian Actualism' (as laid out by G.W. Fitch) wherein what is possible is conditioned solely on what is (contingently) actual. Notably, in Plantinga and Adams' abstractionist possible world ontology, worlds exist necessarily in order to secure the (seemingly) infinite 'ways things might have been'; this is not to say that only actualists have such a populated ontology, certainly Lewis has not only population but crowdedness! The Aristotelian actualist though, claims that possible worlds are both abstract objects (propositional or otherwise) and that they exist according to how things happen to be in this world. 'Actual' here is not an indexical term (as it is for Lewis), nor is it a term picking out a world that 'obtains' (as it is for Plantinga and Adams), since, strictly speaking, other worlds' existence is contingent upon actuality - ie. actuality is a kind of primitive.
I think Kant's idea in 'One Possible Basis...' is something akin to Aristotelian actualism. Granted, the Divine Mind serves as a place wherein all properties are safely secured and in this sense, possible worlds (being, as Leibniz had it, so many compossible collections of properties) are necessary in a certain sense. And yet, there is the comittment that if it were the case, per impossible, that God was not an actual being, but instead merely possible, there could be no possible worlds either. It seems to me that if one is to be an Aristotelian actualist, one must eventually find a ground in a Necessary Being. Fitch seems to think that since it is the case that 'Socrates could have been a gymnast' would not be true in worlds wherein Socrates doesn't exist - such a proposition is only possibly possible. I tend to think though, that in an actual world wherein Socrates does not exist, it is still a necessary truth that there are some worlds wherein Socrates does exist and presumably wherein (at least one of these) he is a gymnast. In short, I think that possibly possible just collapses into possible simpliciter. And if one thinks such a thing with a strong comittment to S5, then eventually there will have to be something that is necessarily actual in order to house all of these de re possibilities.
Regarding Kant's proof, I wonder whether or not the onus is on someone who posits a Necessary Being to do the housing to show that all of the properties which go to make-up worlds have to be metaphysically compossible (in Kant's sense). Why think that the 'housing of properties' in the Divine Being has to be conjunctive between possible worlds? That is, why can we not say that God's Understanding contains many self-contained (metaphyiscally) possible worlds? I don't see the need for Kant to claim that all properties must be metaphysically compossible; even Leibniz thought that some concepts were incompossible with other concepts. And if he could claim that there are many self-contained metaphysically possible worlds, perhaps each with the same fundamental material make-up, there seems to be no need for him to show that any properties do not metaphyisically conflict with one another.
All one has to say, I think, is the following: "The possibility of any world that is actual obtaining - whichever world happens to be actual - is grounded in an actually necessary being wherein every metaphyiscally compossible world exists". One would not have to go on to attempt to prove that certain properties are metaphysically compossible - all he would have to say is: since this world is actual, it is clear that there is, in the Divine Mind, a certain world in which the properties (fundamental or otherwise) are not metaphysically inharmonious. Once Kant has shown that something like Aristotelian actualism is true - that what is metaphyiscally (or really) possible must have materially harmonious elements - then he can go on to present a picture of the Divine Mind as securing those truths by means of self-contained (metaphysically) compossible worlds.
The thought here is, I think, that if what Chignell calls the 'modal principle of sufficient reason' can be shown to be the correct analysis of possibility, why should Kant have to say anything on which properties are metaphysically possible and which aren't? There simply is actuality, revealing (some of the) possibilities which are metaphysically possible and, given that there must be an ultimate root - there is a Divine Being that is necessarily actual housing any possibilities that might turn out to be actual.
Showing posts with label possibility. Show all posts
Showing posts with label possibility. Show all posts
Monday, October 13, 2008
Wednesday, July 16, 2008
On Aristotelian Actualism
Here is an interesting appellation for a philosophical position! The initial question is: how could any philosophical tenet which claimed in any way to be Aristotelian fail to have actualist commitments? Aristotelian Actualism has such commitments in the expected way - this brand of actualism states that there are no de re modal facts about non-actual objects - ala Adams in 'Actualism and Thisness'. I find this claim theoretically sound - if one is an actualist that is. However, interestingly enough, note that even if one is a possibilitist, one still does not grant a modal profile to non-actual objects since, for the counterpart theorist (excepting here Paul perhaps, though I yet find her position to fall back into straight Lewisian counterpart theory), no object in and of itself has any modal features; not just the indexically-picked 'actual' objects of our world - but none simpliciter.
The more important claim of Aristotelian Actualism however, is the following: what is possible might have not been possible - or, put in another way, there are things which are not possible but which might have been possible. This claim stems from the facts that (i)no non-actual object has a modal profile and (ii)which world (and objects therein) is actual is a contingent matter. But if this is the case, how do we secure the modal claims which involve quantification over non-actual objects and their de re character? In his 'In Defense of Aristotelian Actualism', GW Fitch suggests that we use Adams' 'truth-at-a-world' distinction - these objects do not have a modal profile, but if they were actual, they would.
Now, as an actualist, I find the claim of Aristotelian Actualism intuitively plausible. But I do have a certain qualm with it - it must rely on the accessibility relation. I am deeply committed to an S5 system of modal logic wherein what is possible is necessarily possible - and this is something that the Aristotelian Actualist must deny. But must an actualist simpliciter deny it? I think not; Plantinga, to the extent that he is, as he claims, an actualist, accepts an S5 system of logic.
Firstly then, note that the accessibility relation that is said to hold between possible worlds collapses into incoherency when we note that each possible world contains every other in the following sense: what is possible in W is, no matter what world happens to be actual, still possible in W.That is, every possible world, being abstractions from the concrete world, contains facts about every other possible world. So certain facts about some object which exists in W, but not in W2, still are possible 'from' W2, since the object would have existed were W actual - and there are, furthermore, definitive facts about that object's existence in W2. So, the tenet that Aristotelian Actualism holds which rests upon the accessibility relation is incoherent because any object that is a possible existent is a possible existent 'from' any possible world; admittedly, there is a certain sense according to which certain objects are not possible from certain possible worlds, but this is not possibility per se, but rather some attenuated form of physical possibility.
How can one be an actualist and yet claim that there are certain de re facts about non-actual object? Well, firstly, I think that an actualist has a strong commitment to the denial of non-actual objects. But I also think that the actualist ought to have an equally strong commitment to the sufficiency of the concrete world to provide the basis for any and every object which might exist - that the furniture of the concrete world is large enough to seat any and all modal profiles of any possibly existing objects. This being said, I agree with the Aristotelian Actualist that there are no, as Mondadori puts is, distinct possibilities for non-actual (read: non-existing) objects, but I do not agree that when these objects come into existence, something is made possible which was not already so. Non-actual objects do have full modal profiles, but they are simply not 'present' in the concrete world.
This is the intuition behind the claim that, if these objects were actual, they would have such and such modal profiles. In other words, there is a definitive fact about non-actual object's modal characters, but it is a fact which is yet to obtain. There are, as Adams might put the matter, no propositions with them as constituents, but there would be a definitive set of such propositions, should they come into existence.
In short, I agree with Aristotelian Actualism to the extent that it claims that de re modal characters are applicable only to actual objects and that all other possibility claims about non-actual objects are merely 'generic'. But I do not agree that, had some other world been actual, and some other set of objects actual, that there would be things possible that were not previously. Rather, these de re distinct possibilities were always possible, since the objects themselves were always so, but they are now 'attainable' on account of them being present in the concrete world.
The more important claim of Aristotelian Actualism however, is the following: what is possible might have not been possible - or, put in another way, there are things which are not possible but which might have been possible. This claim stems from the facts that (i)no non-actual object has a modal profile and (ii)which world (and objects therein) is actual is a contingent matter. But if this is the case, how do we secure the modal claims which involve quantification over non-actual objects and their de re character? In his 'In Defense of Aristotelian Actualism', GW Fitch suggests that we use Adams' 'truth-at-a-world' distinction - these objects do not have a modal profile, but if they were actual, they would.
Now, as an actualist, I find the claim of Aristotelian Actualism intuitively plausible. But I do have a certain qualm with it - it must rely on the accessibility relation. I am deeply committed to an S5 system of modal logic wherein what is possible is necessarily possible - and this is something that the Aristotelian Actualist must deny. But must an actualist simpliciter deny it? I think not; Plantinga, to the extent that he is, as he claims, an actualist, accepts an S5 system of logic.
Firstly then, note that the accessibility relation that is said to hold between possible worlds collapses into incoherency when we note that each possible world contains every other in the following sense: what is possible in W is, no matter what world happens to be actual, still possible in W.That is, every possible world, being abstractions from the concrete world, contains facts about every other possible world. So certain facts about some object which exists in W, but not in W2, still are possible 'from' W2, since the object would have existed were W actual - and there are, furthermore, definitive facts about that object's existence in W2. So, the tenet that Aristotelian Actualism holds which rests upon the accessibility relation is incoherent because any object that is a possible existent is a possible existent 'from' any possible world; admittedly, there is a certain sense according to which certain objects are not possible from certain possible worlds, but this is not possibility per se, but rather some attenuated form of physical possibility.
How can one be an actualist and yet claim that there are certain de re facts about non-actual object? Well, firstly, I think that an actualist has a strong commitment to the denial of non-actual objects. But I also think that the actualist ought to have an equally strong commitment to the sufficiency of the concrete world to provide the basis for any and every object which might exist - that the furniture of the concrete world is large enough to seat any and all modal profiles of any possibly existing objects. This being said, I agree with the Aristotelian Actualist that there are no, as Mondadori puts is, distinct possibilities for non-actual (read: non-existing) objects, but I do not agree that when these objects come into existence, something is made possible which was not already so. Non-actual objects do have full modal profiles, but they are simply not 'present' in the concrete world.
This is the intuition behind the claim that, if these objects were actual, they would have such and such modal profiles. In other words, there is a definitive fact about non-actual object's modal characters, but it is a fact which is yet to obtain. There are, as Adams might put the matter, no propositions with them as constituents, but there would be a definitive set of such propositions, should they come into existence.
In short, I agree with Aristotelian Actualism to the extent that it claims that de re modal characters are applicable only to actual objects and that all other possibility claims about non-actual objects are merely 'generic'. But I do not agree that, had some other world been actual, and some other set of objects actual, that there would be things possible that were not previously. Rather, these de re distinct possibilities were always possible, since the objects themselves were always so, but they are now 'attainable' on account of them being present in the concrete world.
Wednesday, June 4, 2008
Concretism and Abstractionism: Grounds of Possibility
What exactly is the character of possible worlds and, more importantly, whence the ground of possibility for objects?
There are essentially two paths one might take of the character of possible worlds: concretism and abstractionism. The concretist, ala Lewis, understands possible worlds to be maximal collocations of spatio-temporally related objects. The abstractionist, ala Adams or Plantinga, understands possible worlds to be maximally consistent sets of propositions or states-of-affairs. Notice then that the abstractionist holds that there are two sorts of things in the Universe (where the term 'Universe' means the entirety of reality) - possible worlds and a concrete world to which these possible worlds might 'match-up'.
So, the concretist believes that all worlds are, so to speak, on the same playing field - each is just as 'real' as every other; hence the concretist's inherent commitment to an indexical analysis of actuality. The abstractionist however, believes that one possible world is privileged - only one world happens to match-up to the concrete world; of course, concretists have no need to have anything 'match-up' to anything else.
What then are these two conceptions' respective theories of the foundation of de re possibility? The concretists founds the de re possibilities of an object in its counterparts - those objects in different possible worlds which are qualitatively similar to the object in question. What makes it possible that an object x have a property P (one which it doesn't actually possess) is the fact that y, a qualitatively similar (but necessarily distinct) object existing in another possible world actually does have P.
The abstractionist, on the other hand, founds the de re possibilities of an object in a proposition which expresses a state of affairs containing the object actually possessing the property in question. What makes it possible that x possess P is that there (necessarily) exists a proposition which is part of a possible world of the form 'x has P'. This proposition being a part of a possible world just means, as Plantinga states, that if this possible world were actual (that is, if it did in fact match-up to the concrete world) then it would be the case that x would have P.
Now, although I think that there are plenty of problems for either view of possible worlds - I want to point out two pertinent ones here which I think go directly against our intuitional common sense.
The first is, why should we agree that the fact that some other object, wholly distinct from x and only related to it by way of it being merely qualitatively similar to it in certain respects, in virtue of it standing in some closed spatio-temporal relation to some other objects in another fully concrete world has any say whatsoever in the de re possibilities of x? The question is not the familiar objection to counterpart theory - namely "What's he got to do with me?" (though I think this is a valid and pertinent objection). Rather, the question is - what has concreteness and qualitative similarity in a counterpart have to do with grounding modal facts about objects?
Secondly, concerning abstractionism, why should we agree that a proposition in a 'Platonic Heaven' has any fundamental role in determining which things are possible for an object and which are not? The abstractionist seems to me rather to have things the wrong way around - it is the objects in the concrete world and their dispositional properties therein which ground whether or not there exist such propositions expressing states of affairs wherein they possess some certain property.
Besides this, why should we agree, with the abstractionist, that propositions which do not match-up with the concrete world even exist in any form whatsoever? Now, Plantinga certainly has independent motivation for holding this brand of abstractionism - his actualism entails, he thinks, the need to have an 'essence' which grounds the fact that there are propositions about non-existent individuals. But I am inclined to think, with Adams, that there are no singular propositions about non-actual individuals - these propositions supervene on actual existents. And I am also therefore inclined to think that propositions about an object x possessing a property P 'exist', but not, as it were, pre-objectually or extra-objectually.
There are essentially two paths one might take of the character of possible worlds: concretism and abstractionism. The concretist, ala Lewis, understands possible worlds to be maximal collocations of spatio-temporally related objects. The abstractionist, ala Adams or Plantinga, understands possible worlds to be maximally consistent sets of propositions or states-of-affairs. Notice then that the abstractionist holds that there are two sorts of things in the Universe (where the term 'Universe' means the entirety of reality) - possible worlds and a concrete world to which these possible worlds might 'match-up'.
So, the concretist believes that all worlds are, so to speak, on the same playing field - each is just as 'real' as every other; hence the concretist's inherent commitment to an indexical analysis of actuality. The abstractionist however, believes that one possible world is privileged - only one world happens to match-up to the concrete world; of course, concretists have no need to have anything 'match-up' to anything else.
What then are these two conceptions' respective theories of the foundation of de re possibility? The concretists founds the de re possibilities of an object in its counterparts - those objects in different possible worlds which are qualitatively similar to the object in question. What makes it possible that an object x have a property P (one which it doesn't actually possess) is the fact that y, a qualitatively similar (but necessarily distinct) object existing in another possible world actually does have P.
The abstractionist, on the other hand, founds the de re possibilities of an object in a proposition which expresses a state of affairs containing the object actually possessing the property in question. What makes it possible that x possess P is that there (necessarily) exists a proposition which is part of a possible world of the form 'x has P'. This proposition being a part of a possible world just means, as Plantinga states, that if this possible world were actual (that is, if it did in fact match-up to the concrete world) then it would be the case that x would have P.
Now, although I think that there are plenty of problems for either view of possible worlds - I want to point out two pertinent ones here which I think go directly against our intuitional common sense.
The first is, why should we agree that the fact that some other object, wholly distinct from x and only related to it by way of it being merely qualitatively similar to it in certain respects, in virtue of it standing in some closed spatio-temporal relation to some other objects in another fully concrete world has any say whatsoever in the de re possibilities of x? The question is not the familiar objection to counterpart theory - namely "What's he got to do with me?" (though I think this is a valid and pertinent objection). Rather, the question is - what has concreteness and qualitative similarity in a counterpart have to do with grounding modal facts about objects?
Secondly, concerning abstractionism, why should we agree that a proposition in a 'Platonic Heaven' has any fundamental role in determining which things are possible for an object and which are not? The abstractionist seems to me rather to have things the wrong way around - it is the objects in the concrete world and their dispositional properties therein which ground whether or not there exist such propositions expressing states of affairs wherein they possess some certain property.
Besides this, why should we agree, with the abstractionist, that propositions which do not match-up with the concrete world even exist in any form whatsoever? Now, Plantinga certainly has independent motivation for holding this brand of abstractionism - his actualism entails, he thinks, the need to have an 'essence' which grounds the fact that there are propositions about non-existent individuals. But I am inclined to think, with Adams, that there are no singular propositions about non-actual individuals - these propositions supervene on actual existents. And I am also therefore inclined to think that propositions about an object x possessing a property P 'exist', but not, as it were, pre-objectually or extra-objectually.
Friday, April 11, 2008
The Plague of Predicative Essentialism
I can't accept any theory that posits the essence of an object to be comprised of, or reducible to a set of properties.
The essence of an object is that from which all the properties of an object flow.
The following is an appropriate picture: An infinite amount of essences exist, none differing solo numero and all being in the company of one another. Their being present to one another results in each of them contributing to a relational situs wherein each of the essences exhibit some set of characteristics resulting from the relationship of it to every other essence in its presence. Each essence is, in virtue of its particular relationship to every other object, clothed in a certain quiddity comprised of a total set of properties. Objects are hylomorphic - equally essence and properties, haecceity and suchness, non-qualitative and qualitative, individual and communal, non-relational and relational.
Any account wherein properties are considered primitive must view the essence of an object as ineffectually inactive or else a derivative entity. But such an account cannot explain how these properties can be their own de re foundation or how they can set a non-trivial limit to and specification of the property possession of an object. In short, the effects of primitivising properties is that all investigation of the nature of objects must be left to logical analysis. Possibility will be nothing more than non-contradiction between the predicates of an object and the predicates comprising some conceptual context. Necessity will be merely the impossibility of non-contradiction between the predicates of an object and the predicates comprising some conceptual context. But diamonds and boxes are only conceptual aids.
Real possibility flows from the essence of an object - it declares a property possible just in case the property is compossible with every other property in some conceptual context and there is some property that the object has from which, if it were to be included in this context,it would follow that the property in question would be exemplified. This is the real character of Leibnizian worlds - one which respects the pregnancy of properties with determinate properties founded in the relationship of the 'concept' of the object in respect to every other object.
The essence of an object is that from which all the properties of an object flow.
The following is an appropriate picture: An infinite amount of essences exist, none differing solo numero and all being in the company of one another. Their being present to one another results in each of them contributing to a relational situs wherein each of the essences exhibit some set of characteristics resulting from the relationship of it to every other essence in its presence. Each essence is, in virtue of its particular relationship to every other object, clothed in a certain quiddity comprised of a total set of properties. Objects are hylomorphic - equally essence and properties, haecceity and suchness, non-qualitative and qualitative, individual and communal, non-relational and relational.
Any account wherein properties are considered primitive must view the essence of an object as ineffectually inactive or else a derivative entity. But such an account cannot explain how these properties can be their own de re foundation or how they can set a non-trivial limit to and specification of the property possession of an object. In short, the effects of primitivising properties is that all investigation of the nature of objects must be left to logical analysis. Possibility will be nothing more than non-contradiction between the predicates of an object and the predicates comprising some conceptual context. Necessity will be merely the impossibility of non-contradiction between the predicates of an object and the predicates comprising some conceptual context. But diamonds and boxes are only conceptual aids.
Real possibility flows from the essence of an object - it declares a property possible just in case the property is compossible with every other property in some conceptual context and there is some property that the object has from which, if it were to be included in this context,it would follow that the property in question would be exemplified. This is the real character of Leibnizian worlds - one which respects the pregnancy of properties with determinate properties founded in the relationship of the 'concept' of the object in respect to every other object.
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