Kantian Derivitives, pt. 1

It seems that we may agree with the Kantian thesis in a certain manner; that is, conceived in much the same way that Aristotle viewed the truth in Platonism. For it seems most correct in a general sense that the perceived, or experienced world is as it is perceived on account of the perceiver - that the individual has its own unique relationships to others on account of its individuality. And in this sense the "subject conditions the object".

But viewing the matter more closely, we may observe, as Aristotle did, that this conditioning is not generally encompassing - in the way that the 'Form of Beauty' encompasses and conditions all beautiful things, but rather that it is inherent in every object. For every object may be understood to have both numenal and phenomenal aspects wherein its numenal aspect allows for and 'conditions' what it may express phenomenally; comparable then, to Aristotle's conception of 'substance' in particular beings as their ground and intelligible foundation.

It may be said then that what is true for one object, namely a particular man (and it seems the whole of mankind) is true for every other - that is, that he views the world as he experiences it through the relations which he bears to others on account of, or in the fashion of, his own unique perspective. For it may be said that his 'intuition' allows all 'experience', following Kant, but not in the general sense meaning that all subjects know others by means of themselves, but rather in that his uniqueness allows for and governs his experience. As it may perhaps be better stated, that each object's uniqueness is the foundation of and is the principle of allowance for its relationships it expresses in regards to every other object.

Just as Kant believed that the intuitional 'categories' were the 'transcendent concepts' by which experience is made possible, so Plato believed that the Forms were the immutable 'ideas' which all experience relied upon in order for it to be. So we may, following Aristotle, insist that this general conception of foundational allowance is inherent in every object and is proper to each of them in their own particular manner. There will then be understood that every object's form establishes and makes possible its material, for this is nothing more than saying that the subject conditions its object. In other words, an object's unchanging and limiting form determines the manner in which it may be related to others. The point being that man is no special case and that he follows the general manner of being.

Indeed, it seems absurd that man alone, by virtue of his intuitional 'categories' shapes and forms to himself the entirety of other object's being. This thesis is refuted by our understanding of rule-governed change in phenomenal experience - each object, though it be perceived by us, has its proper limits of representation. And we do not ourselves construct this, but it is required in order that the object be represented to us at all.

Therefore, every object has its own personal 'intuitional' aspect which is not common among all objects (as Kant's 'Space' and 'Time' categories are) which allows and conditions the manner in which it may represent itself; in man there is truly no difference. Kant's error then was to suppose an undifferentiated realm upon which we impose our own intutitional 'categories' - it seems more consistent and proper to regard our experience as governed by our own individuality and our experience of others according to their individuality and ours aligning with one another. That is, though our experience of objects depends on our uniqueness, it in the same regard depends on their own uniquenesses as well.