On Kant's 'One Possible Basis for a Proof of the Existence of God'

I recently was sent an upcoming article by Andrew Chignell from Allen Wood about Kant's ontological argument. Here are some thoughts that I sent to Professor Wood about Chignell's article and a brief analysis of the seeming incoherency (or incompleteness) of Kant's account.

As far as I can tell, Chignell seems to think that Kant's proof doesn't end up working because he has yet to show that all of the 'fundamental' properties are 'harmonious' - ie. that their combination in a single subject is metaphysically possible, where metaphysically possible means that the properties in question actually do not conflict, rather than it being the case that one cannot concieve their non-conflict (this Kant takes to be the characteristic form of logical possibility). Of course, as Chignell states, Leibniz's proof is certainly merely logical in this sense, since he takes properties to express 'reality' or 'positive degrees of perfection' which cannot conflict with one another due to contradictions arising only 'through negation'. Chignell maintains that Kant does not (and cannot) prove the material coherence of all of the fundamental properties with one another and so his proof rests on the same shaky footing as Leibniz's.

I wonder though, about the status of Kant's assumption of real, metaphysical possibility being fundamentally conditioned by actuality. As you know, there are many philosophers who think that an actualist metaphysic fails because of singular existential statements involving non-existent entites - the worry is: how do you ground the fact that there might have existed some obect x, wholly distinct from every other actual object? Of course, I think Adams' "true at" and "true in" distinction of possible world semantics solves this problem well enough.

But there is another worry that I wonder about - so-called 'Aristotelian Actualism' (as laid out by G.W. Fitch) wherein what is possible is conditioned solely on what is (contingently) actual. Notably, in Plantinga and Adams' abstractionist possible world ontology, worlds exist necessarily in order to secure the (seemingly) infinite 'ways things might have been'; this is not to say that only actualists have such a populated ontology, certainly Lewis has not only population but crowdedness! The Aristotelian actualist though, claims that possible worlds are both abstract objects (propositional or otherwise) and that they exist according to how things happen to be in this world. 'Actual' here is not an indexical term (as it is for Lewis), nor is it a term picking out a world that 'obtains' (as it is for Plantinga and Adams), since, strictly speaking, other worlds' existence is contingent upon actuality - ie. actuality is a kind of primitive.

I think Kant's idea in 'One Possible Basis...' is something akin to Aristotelian actualism. Granted, the Divine Mind serves as a place wherein all properties are safely secured and in this sense, possible worlds (being, as Leibniz had it, so many compossible collections of properties) are necessary in a certain sense. And yet, there is the comittment that if it were the case, per impossible, that God was not an actual being, but instead merely possible, there could be no possible worlds either. It seems to me that if one is to be an Aristotelian actualist, one must eventually find a ground in a Necessary Being. Fitch seems to think that since it is the case that 'Socrates could have been a gymnast' would not be true in worlds wherein Socrates doesn't exist - such a proposition is only possibly possible. I tend to think though, that in an actual world wherein Socrates does not exist, it is still a necessary truth that there are some worlds wherein Socrates does exist and presumably wherein (at least one of these) he is a gymnast. In short, I think that possibly possible just collapses into possible simpliciter. And if one thinks such a thing with a strong comittment to S5, then eventually there will have to be something that is necessarily actual in order to house all of these de re possibilities.

Regarding Kant's proof, I wonder whether or not the onus is on someone who posits a Necessary Being to do the housing to show that all of the properties which go to make-up worlds have to be metaphysically compossible (in Kant's sense). Why think that the 'housing of properties' in the Divine Being has to be conjunctive between possible worlds? That is, why can we not say that God's Understanding contains many self-contained (metaphyiscally) possible worlds? I don't see the need for Kant to claim that all properties must be metaphysically compossible; even Leibniz thought that some concepts were incompossible with other concepts. And if he could claim that there are many self-contained metaphysically possible worlds, perhaps each with the same fundamental material make-up, there seems to be no need for him to show that any properties do not metaphyisically conflict with one another.

All one has to say, I think, is the following: "The possibility of any world that is actual obtaining - whichever world happens to be actual - is grounded in an actually necessary being wherein every metaphyiscally compossible world exists". One would not have to go on to attempt to prove that certain properties are metaphysically compossible - all he would have to say is: since this world is actual, it is clear that there is, in the Divine Mind, a certain world in which the properties (fundamental or otherwise) are not metaphysically inharmonious. Once Kant has shown that something like Aristotelian actualism is true - that what is metaphyiscally (or really) possible must have materially harmonious elements - then he can go on to present a picture of the Divine Mind as securing those truths by means of self-contained (metaphysically) compossible worlds.

The thought here is, I think, that if what Chignell calls the 'modal principle of sufficient reason' can be shown to be the correct analysis of possibility, why should Kant have to say anything on which properties are metaphysically possible and which aren't? There simply is actuality, revealing (some of the) possibilities which are metaphysically possible and, given that there must be an ultimate root - there is a Divine Being that is necessarily actual housing any possibilities that might turn out to be actual.

Kantian Derivitives, pt. 1

It seems that we may agree with the Kantian thesis in a certain manner; that is, conceived in much the same way that Aristotle viewed the truth in Platonism. For it seems most correct in a general sense that the perceived, or experienced world is as it is perceived on account of the perceiver - that the individual has its own unique relationships to others on account of its individuality. And in this sense the "subject conditions the object".

But viewing the matter more closely, we may observe, as Aristotle did, that this conditioning is not generally encompassing - in the way that the 'Form of Beauty' encompasses and conditions all beautiful things, but rather that it is inherent in every object. For every object may be understood to have both numenal and phenomenal aspects wherein its numenal aspect allows for and 'conditions' what it may express phenomenally; comparable then, to Aristotle's conception of 'substance' in particular beings as their ground and intelligible foundation.

It may be said then that what is true for one object, namely a particular man (and it seems the whole of mankind) is true for every other - that is, that he views the world as he experiences it through the relations which he bears to others on account of, or in the fashion of, his own unique perspective. For it may be said that his 'intuition' allows all 'experience', following Kant, but not in the general sense meaning that all subjects know others by means of themselves, but rather in that his uniqueness allows for and governs his experience. As it may perhaps be better stated, that each object's uniqueness is the foundation of and is the principle of allowance for its relationships it expresses in regards to every other object.

Just as Kant believed that the intuitional 'categories' were the 'transcendent concepts' by which experience is made possible, so Plato believed that the Forms were the immutable 'ideas' which all experience relied upon in order for it to be. So we may, following Aristotle, insist that this general conception of foundational allowance is inherent in every object and is proper to each of them in their own particular manner. There will then be understood that every object's form establishes and makes possible its material, for this is nothing more than saying that the subject conditions its object. In other words, an object's unchanging and limiting form determines the manner in which it may be related to others. The point being that man is no special case and that he follows the general manner of being.

Indeed, it seems absurd that man alone, by virtue of his intuitional 'categories' shapes and forms to himself the entirety of other object's being. This thesis is refuted by our understanding of rule-governed change in phenomenal experience - each object, though it be perceived by us, has its proper limits of representation. And we do not ourselves construct this, but it is required in order that the object be represented to us at all.

Therefore, every object has its own personal 'intuitional' aspect which is not common among all objects (as Kant's 'Space' and 'Time' categories are) which allows and conditions the manner in which it may represent itself; in man there is truly no difference. Kant's error then was to suppose an undifferentiated realm upon which we impose our own intutitional 'categories' - it seems more consistent and proper to regard our experience as governed by our own individuality and our experience of others according to their individuality and ours aligning with one another. That is, though our experience of objects depends on our uniqueness, it in the same regard depends on their own uniquenesses as well.

Kantian Derivitives, pt.2

The Kantian thesis that if there is an external reality, in the objective sense, it must lie outside of our intellection and therefore be wholly unknowable; even to be known if it exists or not is impossible.

This thesis seems quite admissible, for everything which we experience is in some sense or another a manner of relation - that is, of ourselves to another. These relations are manifested in extension, wherein dimension and depth are functions of relations of perspective; in qualities of the senses in general, as the formerly termed secondary qualities, functions of relations between waves, particles, strings, etc.

So the correctness of the Kantian thesis might be stated: We never experience anything which is without relation. Or, what we experience must involve within it relations. This is the more metaphysical derivative of the thesis of Kant.

But we may all acknowledge this thesis, in fact, we do all acknowledge it. We might all accept it when restated as: Every being has a certain character of experience according to its manner of relation to other beings - ie. the manner in which it relates. The thought: Rose Glasses as perceivers, not veils. So then it seems unquestionably true that all of our experience is conditioned by the subject of the experience, namely us.

But we must realize that there is something over which the subject of experience does not have 'control' - the possibilities of what is experienced. That is, that it may appear to us in such a fashion. For the allowance of appearance is by no means dependent on our experience, which Kant recognized in positing our minds as that which makes experience possible - that is, what makes experience possible is not what is experienced.